On Partiality and Tichy’s Transparent Intensional Logic by Raclavsky, Jiri
JIŘÍ RACLAVSKÝ
Partiality and Tichý’s Transparent 
Intensional Logic
Abstract. The paper focuses on treating partiality within Tichý’s logical 
system. Tichý’s logic is two-valued and type-theoretic. His simple 
theory of types (and the deduction system for it) accepts both total and 
partial functions. Tichý’s late framework is explicitly ramified. So-called 
constructions (roughly: algorithms) construct, e.g., values of functions at 
arguments; in some cases, however, they do not construct anything at all. 
This special partiality phenomenon is discussed in the second part of the 
paper.
1 INTRODUCTION
It will be convenient to begin with a sketch of the history of Pavel Tichý’s 
transparent intensional logic (briefly TIL). One can find roots of TIL already 
in 1960s when Tichý construed intensions (functions from possible worlds) 
as classes of algorithms-procedures which were considered as meanings of 
(empirical) expressions; see Intensions in Terms of Turing Machines (Tichý 
1969) reprinted in (Tichý 2004; hereafter CP). In the very beginning of the 
1970’s, Tichý modified Church’s typed lambda calculus—accepting not only 
individuals and truth-values but also possible worlds; see An Approach to 
Intensional Analysis (1971) in CP. The system differs significantly from that 
developed by Montague (and Montagovians); the lack of space prevents me to 
give here a comparison (cf. Tichý’s own remarks in CP 132-137 and the paper 
Two kinds of intensional logic, CP 307-325).
A new era of TIL (now explicitly designated by this name) is embodied in 
the large monograph (Tichý 1976) which remained unpublished. In this book, 
λ-terms and constructions recorded by them are explicitly distinguished (we 
will return to this issue later). Secondly, partial functions are admitted. Thirdly, 
natural deduction for the system is exposed. Selected parts of the book were 
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published as papers in the second half of 1970s; an exception is (Tichý 1982), 
which is a condensed paper on deduction.
In 1978 (cf. CP 269-270), Tichý added the temporal parameter; intensions 
are thus considered as functions from 〈possible worlds, time-moment〉 couples. 
Interesting logical analyses of temporal discourse (tenses, etc.) and episodic 
verbs were published by Tichý in 1980 (see CP). A more important modification 
of TIL is suggested in (Tichý 1988); Tichý exposed there a remarkable type 
theory which combines, in fact, simple and ramified type theory.
2 ADOPTING PARTIALITY
Let us begin with the recognition that there are both total and partial 
functions. Since many phenomena are to be modelled by partial functions (e.g., 
the chronology of American presidents in the actual world, or the individual 
concept “the king of France”), it is natural to accept them.X
Sometimes it is held that three-valued logic (3V-logic) captures partiality 
and so it is identical with two-valued logic which adopts partiality (2VP-logic). 
This is, however, a questionable matter. For 3V-logic—recognizing T (true), F 
(false), and U (unknown, undecided, …)—is a logic with total functions only. On 
the other hand, 2V-logic recognizes T and F and accepts also a lack of a value 
for some function(s). Thus domains of truth-values of 3V-logic and 2VP-logic do 
differ.Y For instance, there are 27 unary 3V-truth-functions but there are just 9 
total and partial unary 2VP-truth-functions:
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9
T T T T F F F
F T F T F T F
Clearly, the function f4 is classical negation (often denoted by ‘¬’); it is, 
however, entirely missing in 3V-logic (this is why we should say that 3V-logic 
is not a classical logic). Of course, the 3V-function T→F, F→T, U→U looks 
like a counterpart of ¬. For an obvious reason, however, plenty of 3V-functions 
cannot be counterparts of any 2VP-functions. (I will return to the problem of 
representation at the end of the paper.)
Once partial functions are admitted, strange phenomena appear. For 
instance, Schönfinkel’s reduction does not work because one multi-argument 
1  The reader knows that Imre Ruzsa stressed the importance of partiality (cf., e.g., 1.2 in 
Ruzsa 1991).
2  Of course, the acceptance of U or “gap” (as we may call it) is governed by the same intui-
tion.
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(m-ary; m > 1) partial function corresponds to more than one 1-argument function 
(Tichý 1982, 59-60); thus multi-argument functions are irreducible entities. 
Before we proceed further, let me introduce some notions.
3 TICHÝ’S SIMPLE THEORY OF TYPES
Tichý’s simple theory of types—e.g., (Tichý 1982, 60)—treats both total and 
partial functions. It is quite general, since it has an unspecified basis B:
Let B consist of mutually non-overlapping collections of objects. 
a) Any member of B is a type over B.
b) If ζ, ξ1, …, ξm are (not necessarily distinct) types over B, then (ζξ1…ξm), 
which is a collection of all total and partial functions from ξ1, …, ξm into ζ, 
is a type over B.
The (specific) basis of TIL comprises ι (individuals), ο (truth-values T and F), 
ω (possible worlds), and τ (time-moments/real numbers). Intensions are functions 
from ω to (total or partial) chronologies of ξ-objects (a chronology is a function of 
type (ξτ)). Briefly speaking, intensions are functions from 〈possible world, time-
moment〉 couples. ‘((ξτ)ω)’ will be abbreviated to ‘ξτω’. Propositions are of type 
οτω; properties of individuals are of type (οι)τω; individual offices (Tichý’s term) are 
of type ιτω; etc. Objects which are not intensions may be called extensions. For 
instance, classical unary (¬) or binary (∧, ∨, →, ↔) truth-functions are of types 
(οο) and (οοο), respectively; classical quantifiers (∀ξ, ∃ ξ) are of type (ο(οξ)); = ξ is 
of type (οξξ) (’ξ‘ will be suppressed).Z
4 CONSTRUCTIONS
To introduce the idea of constructions, consider the function:
1 → −2
2 → 1
3 → 6
  
This function can be reached by (infinitely) many different (mathematical) 
procedures. For instance, it is induced by multiplying an integer by itself and 
subtracting three from the result (i.e. by (n × n) – 3) or by adding an integer to 
its square and subtracting what one gets by adding three to the integer from 
3  Ruzsa’s type theory (cf. Ruzsa 1989, 3) does not allow some (types of) intensions which 
are admitted by Montagovians and Tichý. It should be added here that Tichý accepts not 
only functions of type ξτω but also of type ξτ or ξω (such functions are not called intensions in 
the present text).
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the result (i.e. by (n2 + n) – (n + 3)). To every such intuitive procedure, there 
corresponds a certain Tichý (numerical) construction. Tichý used λ-terms to 
record constructions and one may view constructions as so-called intensional (i.e. 
not extensional) senses of λ-terms. To get another analogy, recall hyperintensions 
(“structured meanings”) often urged within the logical analysis of natural 
language. It seems also that Frege’s Sinn or Russell’s (structured) propositional 
functions are predecessors of constructions.
Unfortunately, a rigorous definition of constructions cannot be expounded 
here, see (Tichý 1988, 56-65) for that purpose. Omitting here so-called single and 
double execution, there are four kinds of constructions; their brief characterization 
is as follows. Let X be any object (a construction or non-construction) and C any 
construction; let v be any valuation (it is a field that consists of sequences of 
objects of given types):
1. Trivialization 0X v-constructs X (i.e. 0X takes X and leave it as it is).
2. Variable xk v-constructs the kth member of the sequence of objects of a 
given type.
3. Composition [CC1…Cm] v-constructs the value of the function constructed 
by C at the string of objects (i.e. the argument for that function) which 
are constructed by C1, …, Cm; if C or C1 (etc.) does not v-construct such 
object(s) or the function is undefined for that argument, [CC1…Cm] is 
v-improper—it does not v-construct anything at all.[
4.  Closure λx[…x…] v-constructs, in a nutshell, the function which takes 
particular values of x to the objects v-constructed by […x…] on the 
respective valuations (e.g., λn[[n0×n]0–03] v-constructs the function 
sketched above).
One may thus say that these four kinds of constructions are objectual 
correlates of constants, variables (as letters), applications, and abstractions of 
λ-calculi. Realize, however, that constructions are not expressions—they are 
language-independent entities (the proper subject of Tichý’s approach are 
constructions, not expressions of some formal language). For instance, the term 
‘λn[[n0×n]0–03]’ denotes (stands for) the construction λn[[n0×n]0–03]. Realize 
also that constructions are not set-theoretical entities. Note that the term 
‘λn[[n0×n]0–03]’ denotes the procedure as such, not the aforementioned function 
constructed by λn[[n0×n]0– 03] (analogously, ‘[080÷02]’ denotes the construction 
[080÷02], not its result—the number 4).
4  The usual argument for the adoption of hyperintensions is this. Intensional semanticist 
suggests that all true mathematical sentences denote one and the same proposition (which 
is true in all possible worlds). Consequently, ‘Xenia believes that 3+4=7’, ‘49÷7=7’∴‘Xenia 
believes that 3+4=49÷7’ is rendered as a valid inference which is obviously not. Hence more 
fine-grained entities than intensions are needed to be explications of meanings. For another 
reason consider ‘Xenia calculates 3÷0’; the sentence surely describes the agent as related to a 
certain calculation, not to its (non-existing) result.
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For non-circularity conditions, Tichý introduced a ramified theory of types. 
Its definition in (Tichý 1988, 66) has three parts: (a) types of (“classical”) 
set-theoretic objects (cf. the simple-type theoretic part above), (b) types of 
constructions (some constructions are first-order constructions, belonging to the 
type *1, other constructions are second-, third-, …, n-order constructions), (c) 
types of functions from/to constructions.
In the mid-1970s, Tichý already suggested that constructions are explications 
of (natural-language) meanings—having thus the following semantic scheme:
an expression E 
expresses (means) in L
the construction, which is the meaning (or logical analysis) of E in L
constructs
an intension / non-intension / nothing (cf. ‘3÷0’), which is the denotatum of 
E in L
The value of an intension in a possible world w, time-moment t is the 
referent of an empirical expression E (such as ‘dog’, ‘the king of France’, ‘It rains 
in London’); the denotatum and referent of a non-empirical expression are 
understood as identical.
For example (let w and t be variables v-constructing possible worlds and 
time-moments, respectively):
‘The king of France is bald’  an expression E
λwλt[0Baldwt
0KFwt]   the construction expressed by E
\
〈w1,t1〉 → T    the proposition denoted by E
〈w2,t2〉 →    (i.e. gap)
〈w3,t3〉 → F
etc.
T     the referent of E in w1, t1
It is not difficult to show that this semantic theory is capable to deal with 
puzzles created by “intensional” and “hyperintensional” contexts.
5 PARTIALITY AND FAILURE OF CLASSICAL LAWS
From the objectual viewpoint, logical laws are not strings of letters but 
constructions. It is clear that (let o be a variable v-constructing truth-values):
[0∀λo[o0∨[0¬o]] 
5  Trivializations of well-known mathematical or logical functions will be written in the 
infix manner (e.g., ‘[080÷02]’ instead of ‘[0÷0802]’).
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is tautological (the variable o is always a v-proper construction). However, this 
law is scarcely remarkable, one would rather declare that for any proposition, 
it obtains in w, t or it does not obtain in w, t (the excluded middle). Let p 
be a variable v-constructing propositions (i.e. objects of type οτω). Then the 
following construction (which can be closed by [0∀λw[0∀[λt; similarly below) is 
contradictory:
[0∀λp[pwt
0∨[0¬pwt]]]
Since if some proposition is undefined in w, t, then λp[pwt
0∨[0¬pwt]] v-constructs 
a partial class (partial characteristic function) which is empty, thus ∀ takes it to 
the truth-value F.
 We get an analogous failure for the carelessly formulated De Morgan 
law for exchange of quantifiers. Let P be any construction of a proposition where 
P contains x as its free variable (e.g., λwλt[x0=0KFwt]):
[[0¬[0∃λxPwt]]
0↔[0∀λx[0¬Pwt]]]
The construction λwλt[x0=0KFwt]wt (which is reducible to λx[x
0=0KFwt]) can 
v-construct a partial class which is empty thus ∀ takes it to F, not to T as we 
wish.
To avoid the destructive power of partiality, formulating thus the correct 
versions of the laws, I suggest utilizing a “totalizer” overcoming the trouble. In 
Tichý’s framework, there are three kinds of properties “be true” due to their 
applicability to (a) propositions, (b) constructions, (c) expressions (relatively to 
a given language L). Each kind has several variants; the (a)-kind has only two. 
The “partial” truth property of propositions (i.e. an object of type (οοτω)τω) can be 
defined as:]
[0TrueπPwtp] ≡ pwt
thus certain propositions are not in the extension or the anti-extension of that 
property (in w, t). The “total” truth property of propositions can be defined as:
[0TrueπTwtp] ≡ [
0∃λo[[pwt
0=o]0∧[o0=0T]]]
A partial proposition having no value in w, t belongs to the anti-extension of the 
property—it is not true in w, t.
Using 0TrueπT for “totalizing”, the correct law of excluded middle is:
6  ‘Cwt’ abbreviates ‘[[Cw]t]’. Of course, 
0KF is a simplification. The procedure consists in 
taking (a) the property “popular”, (b) applying it to w and t (values of w and t), getting thus 
the extension of “popular”, and then (c) taking “the king of France”, (d) applying it to w and 
t, getting thus the individual who fills that office, and (e) asking whether that individual (if 
any) is in that extension—yielding thus T or F (analogously for other w’s and t’s). 
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[0∀λp[[0TrueπTwtp]
0∨[0¬[0TrueπTwtp]]]]
and the correct De Morgan law is:
[[0¬[0∃λxPwt]]
0↔[0∀λx[0¬[0TrueπTwtP]]]]
So it is clear that partiality affects the rules for substitutivity (e.g., whether o 
can be substituted by pwt), which lead Tichý to the sophisticated theory exposed 
in (Tichý 1982) and in Indiscernibility of Identicals (Tichý 1986), where he paid 
closer attention to constructions involving identity.
6 BETA-REDUCTION, ETA-REDUCTION AND PARTIALITY
But there are more complications with partiality—even classical β-reduction fails 
(β-reduction rule says that [λx[…x…]C] is equivalent to […C…]). Consider:
1. λwλt[0¬[0TrueπTwtλwλt[
0Baldwt
0KFwt]]]
(the analysis of ‘It is not true that the King of France is bald’)
2. λwλt[ λx[0¬[0TrueπTwtλwλt[
0Baldwtx]]] 
0KFwt]
(the analysis of ‘The King of France is such that it is not true that he is 
bald’)
The two constructions v-construct distinct propositions because 1. 
v-constructs a total proposition whereas 2. v-constructs a partial proposition (if 
there is no king of France in w, t, 0KFwt is v-improper, so the proposition is 
gappy). Thus 2. is not β-reducible to 1.^
In (Tichý 1982, 67), β-reduction and β-expansion are explained as deduction 
rules (The Rule of Contraction/Expansion). Tichý’s rule of β-reduction 
contains an explicit condition that the construction C, which is substituted, 
is not v-improper. So conditioned, β-reduction preserves equivalence of 
constructions._
Moreover, η-reduction (that λx[Cx] is reducible-equivalent to C) fails as 
well (Raclavský 2009, 283). Consider [0Fy], where 0F v-constructs a function of 
type ((θζ)ξ) which is undefined for the ξ-object assigned to y by v. Thus [0Fy] 
is v-improper, it v-constructs nothing at all. But λx[[0Fy]x] does v-construct 
an object, namely a function of type (θζ) which is undefined for the ζ-object 
assigned to x by v. Hence λx[[0Fy]x] cannot be equivalent to [0Fy]. The remedy 
(ibid.) is the same as Tichý’s conditioning of β-reduction.
7  Here ≡ means inter-derivability of two constructions (cf. ↔i in CP 489); the two construc-
tions flanking ≡ v-construct one and the same object (a truth-value in this case) or they both 
v-construct nothing at all. The construction [0TrueϖPwtp] can be closed by λwλt[λp and then 
η-reduced to 0TrueϖP (which is used below). See (Raclavský 2008) for more.
8  Cf. (Duží 2003) for more.
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7 ANOTHER WAY OF REPAIRING PARTIALITY
When defining various concepts one sometimes needs to overcome partiality 
of some function. For the sake of illustration, imagine that you sum salaries 
of various people—including the king of France (“…+the salary of(KF)+…”). 
Since there is no king of France, “the salary of(KF)” returns no number. But you 
need a certain number (zero in this case) because you do not want the final sum 
(“…+…+…”) to be undermined by the “local” partiality failure. 
In Tichý’s logic, the delivering of a “dummy value” (e.g. zero) can be 
easily managed in the following way (see Raclavský 2009, 243). Consider a 
partial function F from (type-theoretically appropriate) x’s to (type-theoretically 
appropriate) y’s. Since F is partial, [0Fx] can v-construct nothing; in such case, 
however, you need something—a dummy value. I suggest replacing [0Fx] in a 
construction C (which is affected by partiality of F) by the following construction 
which fulfils our demand:
 [0Sngλz[0If_   [0∃λy[y0=[0Fx]]]
 _Then_  [0∃λo[[o0=[z0=[0Fx]]]0∧[o0=0T]]]
 _Else   [z0=0DummyValue]]]
(the singularization function, Sngξ, takes one-membered classes of ξ-objects to 
their sole members, it is undefined otherwise; if_then_else is the well-known 
ternary truth-function, its trivialization is written in parts; note that there is an 
analogue of “it is trueπT that y=F(x)” in the second line).
8 THREE-VALUED FUNCTIONS REPRESENTED BY PROCEDURES
To conclude this short paper, 2VP-logic incorporating procedures (constructions) 
is capable to capture the intuition which underlies 3V-logic, if 3V-functions 
are modelled not by (partial) functions but by procedures. For instance, the 
3V-function T→F, F→T, U→U can be modelled by [0¬pwt] because this 
construction behaves in an analogous way as that 3V-function: it returns T 
when the proposition p has (in w, t) the truth-value F (and vice versa) but it 
returns nothing if the proposition p is undefined (in w, t). To define procedures 
representing other 3V-functions is usually more involved—one must utilize 
0TrueπT, often together with the dummy-value construction.
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